Long-term abatement potential and current policy trajectories in Latin American countries  by Clarke, Leon et al.
Energy Economics 56 (2016) 513–525
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Energy Economics
j ourna l homepage: www.e lsev ie r .com/ locate /eneecoLong-term abatement potential and current policy trajectories in Latin
American countriesLeon Clarke a,⁎, James McFarland b, Claudia Octaviano c, Bas van Ruijven d, Robert Beach e, Kathryn Daenzer f,
Sara Herreras Martínez g, André F.P. Lucena h, Alban Kitous i, Maryse Labriet j,
Ana Maria Loboguerrero Rodriguez k, Anupriya Mundra a, Bob van der Zwaan l,m,n
a Joint Global Change Research Institute, Paciﬁc Northwest National Laboratory, United States
b United States Environmental Protection Agency, United States
c Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, United States
d National Center for Atmospheric Research, United States
e Research Triangle Institute, United States
f Pennsylvania State University, United States
g Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, The Netherlands
h Energy Planning Program, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
i Joint Research Center, European Commission, Italy
j Eneris Environment Energy Consultants, Spain
k CGIAR Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security CCAFS, Colombia
l Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands (ECN), Policy Studies, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
m Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies, Bologna, Italy
n University of Amsterdam, Faculty of Science (HIMS), Amsterdam, The Netherlands⁎ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: leon.clarke@pnnl.gov (L. Clarke).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2016.01.011
0140-9883/Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open accea b s t r a c ta r t i c l e i n f oArticle history:
Received 29 August 2014
Received in revised form 4 January 2016
Accepted 16 January 2016
Available online 3 February 2016
Jel Classiﬁcation:
Q40
Q50This paper provides perspectives on the role of Latin American and Latin American countries in meeting global
abatement goals, based on the scenarios developed through the CLIMACAP–LAMPmodeling study. Abatement po-
tential in Latin America, among other things, is inﬂuenced by its development status, the large contributions of
non-CO2 and land use change CO2 emissions, and energy endowments. In most scenarios in this study, the eco-
nomic potential to reduce fossil fuel CO2 as well as non-CO2 emissions in Latin America in 2050 is lower than in
the rest of the world (in total) when measured against 2010 emissions, due largely to higher emission growth
in Latin America than in the rest of theworld in the absence of abatement. The potential to reduce land use change
CO2 emissions is complicated by a wide range of factors and is not addressed in this paper (land use emissions are
largely addressed in a companion paper). The study conﬁrms the results of previous research that the variation in
abatement costs acrossmodelsmay vary by an order ofmagnitude ormore, limiting the value of these assessments
and supporting continued calls for research on the degree to which models are effectively representing key local
circumstances that inﬂuence costs and available abatement options. Finally, a review of policies in place in several
Latin American countries at the time of this writing ﬁnds that they would be of varying success in meeting the
emission levels proposed by the most recent IPCC reports to limit global temperature change to 2 °C.
Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Keywords:
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Climate mitigation1. Introduction
Stabilizing GHG concentrations and limiting associated temperature
change will eventually require deep emission reductions from all re-
gions of the world. However, the manner and timing of abatement
will differ across countries and regions. Each country's or region's
contribution will depend on the nature of its emissions in the absence
of abatement (baseline emissions) and the associated potential toss article under the CC BY-NC-ND licreduce those emissions. An important issue within this context is the
nature of possible emission reductions in any country or region consis-
tent with ambitious long-term global climate goals.
This study aims to explore several dimensions of abatement in Latin
America. In speciﬁc, it explores the following questions. First, what are
key characteristics of Latin America that might inﬂuence opportunities
to reduce emissions, including states of development, emission proﬁles,
and energy mixes. Second, is the economic abatement potential higher
or lower in Latin America than in the rest of the world? This question
is related to the appropriate Latin American abatement commitments
in the context of global climate discussions. Third, how might theense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Table 1
Development and CO2 emission indicators.
Source: UNDP, 2013; World Bank, 2014.
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico LAM&C China India EU USA World
GDP/cap, PPP (2011 $)a N/Ae 14,323 21,049 11,637 16,316 14,366 10,756 5050 33,294 50,866 13,609
GDP/cap, MER (curr. US$)a 14,680 11,320 15,245 7763 9818 9773 6093 1503 32,917 51,755 10,351
Urban population (%)a 93 85 89 76 78 79 52 32 74 83 53
Access to electricity (%)b 97 99 N/A 97 N/A 95 100 75 N/A N/A 78
Access to improved sanitation (%)a 97 81 99 80 85 82 65 36 100 100 64
Gini indexc 44 55d 52d 56 47 N/A 42d 34 30 49 N/A
HDIa 0.811 0.730 0.819 0.719 0.775 0.741 0.699 0.553 N/A 0.937 0.694
IHDIa 0.653 0.531 0.664 0.519 0.593 0.550 0.543 0.392 N/A 0.821 0.532
CO2 emission (metric ton/cap)c 4.47 2.15 4.21 1.63 3.76 2.91 6.19 1.67 7.35 17.56 4.88
CO2 intensity of energy (kg/kgoe)c 2.31 1.58 2.34 2.35 2.48 2.14 3.29 2.78 2.15 2.45 2.53
CO2 intensity (kg/GDP, PPP)c N/A 0.15 0.22 0.15 0.24 0.21 0.67 0.36 0.22 0.36 0.38
Primary Energy (GJ/cap)c 77 57 76 29 63 41 76 24 142 300 77
Final Energy (GJ/cap)c 56 45 58 20 40 30 47 16 99 203 53
a Data for 2012.
b Data for 2011.
c Data for 2010.
d Data for 2009.
e GDP in PPP data for Argentina is not available from the World Bank.
514 L. Clarke et al. / Energy Economics 56 (2016) 513–525economic abatement potential vary across countries within Latin
America? Fourth, how much would it cost to implement substantial
emission reductions in Latin America through 2050? Finally, how con-
sistentwere plans in Latin American countries at the time of thiswriting
with longer-term climate or abatement goals? To explore these issues,
this study makes use of recently developed scenarios from the
CLIMACAP–LAMP modeling study1 (van der Zwaan, et al., in this
volume).
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 ﬁrst pro-
vides background on development and energy patterns in Latin
America, both of which will inﬂuence opportunities for abatement in
Latin American countries. Section 3 discusses the speciﬁcation of sce-
narios used in this study and describes the models participating in the
study. Section 4 then discusses economic abatement potential in Latin
American countries and the possible reductions in the region as a
whole consistent with the goal of limiting the increase in global surface
temperature to less than 2 °C at the lowest global economic cost.
Section 5 discusses carbon prices and the costs of abatement. Section 6
then explores the degree to which planned activities in Latin
American countries (at the time of this writing) were consistent with
a 2 °C goal. Section 7 provides ﬁnal perspectives and identiﬁes several
future research needs.
2. Key issues for understanding policy in Latin America
The opportunities for abatement vary across countries for several
reasons. One of these, the level of development, is particularly impor-
tant for understanding global climate discussions and in drafting
policies that are adequate to national circumstances. The level of
development inﬂuences the capacity of countries to take action on
abatement, gives some indication of the potential for economic growth
and associated emission growth, and raises important issues surround-
ing the linkage between abatement and sustainable development.2 The
level of development in the different Latin American countries
inﬂuences climate policy choices, as countries try to balance costs and
beneﬁts of abatement while allowing for human development (see
Section 6).1 The Integrated CLimateModelingAnd CAPacity building in Latin America (CLIMACAP)
and Latin AmericanModeling Project (LAMP)were conducted jointly to explore issues as-
sociatedwith abatement in Latin America. Data used for this paper can be found at https://
tntcat.iiasa.ac.at/CLIMACAP-LAMPDB/.
2 An analysis of the relationship between climate policy and development in Latin
America can be found in Samaniego (2009), including concerns about the high vulnerabil-
ity of the region to climate impacts and issues surrounding costs and opportunities of re-
gional and international abatement policy.According to the UNDP, the state of human development in Latin
America3 is second among the developing world, and above the global
average, as measured by the inequality-adjusted human development
index4 (IHDI) (see Table 1). On average, the region enjoys higher living
standards than China and India, but it remains behind developed
countries such as the U.S. and those in Europe (Table 1). Latin
America's income per capita is 2.9 times that of India, but only 27% of
that of the U.S., and it lags behind in important indicators such as access
to electricity and improved sanitation. Urbanization is high in the
region, with a 79% of the population living in cities, as compared to,
for example, 31% of the Indian urban population.
Although countries in Latin America havemade progress in reducing
income inequality, Latin America still has the highest disparities in
wealth distribution in the world. Brazil and Mexico, for example, are
characterized by very high Gini coefﬁcients measuring income inequal-
ity (Table 1) and all of the Latin American countries in this study have
substantially lower IHDIs than unadjusted human development indices
(HDIs). In 2010, 37million people lived in extremepoverty in the region
(with less than $1.25 per day) (UNDP, 2013). Thus, climate policy for
Latin America needs to carefully consider distributional issues, both at
the international and national levels (Chakravarty et al., 2009;
Markandya, 2011).
Associatedwith the level of economic development,ﬁnal energy and
primary energy consumption per capita in Latin America arewell below
that of Europe and the U.S., and generally below the world average
(Table 1). Chile, Argentina and Brazil have the highest ﬁnal energy con-
sumption per capita in Latin America, but these values are still at about
half of that of the EU and around 25% of that in the U.S. Similar patterns
hold with respect to primary energy consumption.
Emissions per capita are strongly linked to economic output, and to
the level of developmentmore broadly, but there is variation in this cor-
relation (Fig. 1). For example, the Latin American and Caribbean region
(LAM&C) has a similar IHDI as China but lower emissions per capita.
These variations in emission intensity of the different Latin American
economies reﬂect different structures of the energy system, but also dif-
ferences in policies and resource endowments.
An important consideration in understanding the potential for
climate abatement is the structure of the energy system. The future3 In this circumstance, Latin America refers to Latin America and the Caribbean.
4 The human development index measures development along three dimensions: life
expectancy, educational attainment and command over the resources needed for a decent
living. The IHDI is the HDI adjusted for inequalities in each of the three dimensions of the
HDI (health, education and income). The IHDI will be equal to the HDI value when there is
no inequality, but falls below the HDI value as inequality rises. See UNDP (2013). Because
inequality is high in most Latin American countries, we use the IHDI in this paper.
Fig. 1. Human development and fossil energy and industrial CO2 emissions for selected
Latin American and other countries. The size of the bubbles represents the total CO2 emis-
sions of the country.
Source: UNDP (2013).
515L. Clarke et al. / Energy Economics 56 (2016) 513–525abatement potential of energy systems depends on the role of renew-
ables and fossil energy sources in the energy mix and the available
future resources for non-carbon energy sources. Aswithmost countries,
oil constitutes a large portion of the energy system in Latin America
(Fig. 2), primarily for use in transportation. However, unlike the U.S.,
the EU, or China, most Latin American countries currently have only a
minimal reliance on coal. Only Argentina and Mexico currently
consume natural gas as a large portion of the electricity sector. Several
Latin American countries currently rely heavily on hydropower,
particularly Brazil and Colombia.
The characteristics of the electricity sector are of particular impor-
tance (Fig. 1 in the Supplementary material), because studies generally
indicate that this is an important near-term priority for decarbonization
(Clarke et al., 2014, van der Zwaan et al., 2013). Themost noticeable dif-
ference between Latin American electricity systems and those of the
rest of the world is that those in Latin America generally use little coal,
which limits the potential to reduce emissions by rolling back the use
of coal. Instead, Latin American countries are far more reliant on natural
gas (especially Argentina and Mexico) and hydropower (notably Brazil
and Colombia). Both of these provide for lower emissions per unit of
electricity than coal-based electricity systems. It is important to note,
however, that these electricity mixes may change substantially in the0%
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Fig. 2. Shares of fuels in total primary energy supply in 2010 for selected countries and regio
methodology (IEA, 2012a, 2012b).coming decades even without climate policy (see van Ruijven et al., in
this volume and van der Zwaan et al., in this volume). In particular,
expansion of hydropower may be limited, meaning that an expanding
electricity system will potentially need to rely on other sources,
including fossil sources or other renewables.
A ﬁnal issue of importance for understanding abatement in Latin
America is the sources of GHG emissions. In most regions, and particu-
larly the developed regions, CO2 emission from energy and industry
accounted for at least 95% of total CO2 emissions in 2008 (Fig. 3),
whichmade up about 80% of all GHG emissions. In Latin America, how-
ever, over 30% of CO2 emissions in 2008were from landuse changes and
about 40% of GHG emissions were from non-CO2 emissions. However,
there are large variations from this distribution across Latin American
countries. Mexico and Chile are comparable to many developed coun-
tries in terms of emission structure, but land use related emissions
and non-CO2 greenhouse-gases accounted for about two-third of GHG
emissions in Brazil and Colombia and almost half of the GHG emissions
from Argentina in 2008. This means that climate policy in these coun-
tries may need to focus more heavily on land and agriculture than in
other world regions. However, it should be noted that Brazil has re-
duced its emissions from deforestation considerably in recent years
(Lapola et al., 2014) and that there is a large potential to keep future de-
forestation levels low (Cohn et al., 2014). The overall complexities asso-
ciatedwith land use change CO2 emissions imply difﬁculties in assessing
their abatement potential in a manner consistent with CO2 from fossil
fuel and industrial sources. For this reason, land use change CO2 abate-
ment potential is not addressed in this paper. It is, instead, addressed
as a distinct topic in a companion paper (Calvin et al., in this volume).
Although non-CO2 emissions continue to be substantial in Latin
America, the importance of non-CO2 emissions is expected to decrease
over time (Fig. 4) due to disproportionate growth in fossil fuel and in-
dustrial CO2 emissions. In addition, the potential for deep reductions
in many non-CO2 substances, for example CH4 and N2O in agriculture,
is substantially more limited than for CO2. This means that, despite
their emissions being roughly comparable in the recent past, reductions
in CO2 will be more important in climate abatement than reductions in
non-CO2 substances in the long-term.
3. Scenarios and models
3.1. Overview of the study design
The CLIMACAP–LAMP project is based on a large set of scenarios
intended to understand climate change abatement in Latin America.
This paper relies on a subset of these scenarios (Table 2). The baselineAM&C China India European
Union
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Fig. 4. FF&I CO2 and non-CO2 GHG emissions in Latin America in the core baseline and emission reductions in the 450 Concentration scenario (see Table 2).
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Fig. 3. Structure of GHG emissions in 2008 (EC-JRC/PBL, 2011). Non-CO2 emissions are converted to CO2-eq emissions based on IPCC SAR GWP-100 values.
516 L. Clarke et al. / Energy Economics 56 (2016) 513–525scenarios provide the starting point for all abatement scenarios in this
analysis. The policy baseline scenario is the basis for the discussion of
current and planned policies in Section 6. The global climate goal
scenarios – those leading to CO2-equivalent concentrations of 450,
550, and 650 – could only be produced by a subset of models with full
global coverage. These scenarios are useful for understanding the link-
age between global climate goals and Latin American emission trajecto-
ries. To understand abatement within Latin America, we have relied on
scenarios leading to emission reductions across Latin America of 20%
and 50% by 2050 relative to 2010 levels. One set of these scenarios fo-
cuses only on fossil fuel CO2 abatement (FF&I); another includes both
fossil fuel CO2 and non-CO2 emissions (GHG). Implementation of these
abatement measures is achieved through a common price on carbon
across Latin American countries.5
Beyond these common requirements regarding abatement ap-
proaches, no additional harmonization was required among models.
This means that model assumptions about key technologies as well as
assumptions about socioeconomic drivers such as population and
economic growth vary across the models. These differences, along
with differences in model structure, are responsible for the variation
in results among models.
As noted above, emissions related to land use are a critical element
of abatement in several Latin American countries. However, the ap-
proaches to land use abatement are complicated by a range of issues5 Note that the implementation approach to achieve a common carbon price across
Latin America was not speciﬁed in the study protocol, meaning that modelers were free
to choose whatever method would most effectively lead to the common carbon price. It
could be achieved through multiple mechanisms, for example a trading scheme or a car-
bon tax. In addition, the approach for treating any carbon revenueswas also not speciﬁed.that makes comparability difﬁcult. For this reason, land use change
emissions are addressed speciﬁcally in a separate paper in this volume
(Calvin et al., in this volume).
3.2. Participating models
Tenmodels participated in construction of the global abatement sce-
narios and the 20% and 50% abatement scenarios (Table 3). Additional
models also produced information for the policy baseline scenarios ex-
plored in Section 6. Not all models completed all scenarios discussed
in this paper.
The models used in this study differ in a number of ways that can
have important implications for the resulting scenarios. One important
area of difference is sectoral coverage. Because of its importance for cli-
mate change, all the models include some representation of the energy
sector (see van der Zwaan et al., in this volume, for more on the energy
system representations in the models). Some models, in addition,
include explicit representations of land use (see Calvin et al., in this
volume). Finally, a number of participatingmodels are “general equilib-
rium” models, meaning that they have a representation of the full
economy and can track changes to GDP or consumption. Models also
vary in terms of the number of countries they cover. Models that pro-
vide information on the whole world provide a basis for understanding
Latin American emission reductions within a global context. Models
which focus on speciﬁc countries can often provide detailed information
at the country level. Models that include all of Latin America may break
the region into a number of subregions or countries or may simply con-
sider LatinAmerica as awhole.Models carry representations of different
emissions, ranging from CO2 only, to CO2, the remaining Kyoto gases,
and short-lived species such as aerosols. Models capture the time
Table 2
Scenarios explored in this paper.
Scenario Description
Core baseline Business-as-usual scenario including climate and
energy policies enacted prior to 2010. “Copenhagen
Pledges” not included.
Policy baseline Assumes implementation of policies implemented
beyond 2010 or currently under consideration,
including “Copenhagen Pledges”. Approach is left to
modeler's choice.
650 concentration Global radiative forcing is kept below 4.5 W/m2
(650 ppmv CO2e) throughout the century.
550 concentration Global radiative forcing is kept below 3.7 W/m2
(550 ppmv CO2e) throughout the century.
450 concentration Global radiative forcing is brought to 2.6 W/m2
(450 ppmv CO2e) by 2100. Concentrations exceed
(“overshoot”) this level before 2100.
20% abatement (FF&I)a Fossil fuel and industrial CO2 emissions are reduced
across Latin America by 5% in 2020, linearly increasing
to 20% in 2050, with respect to 2010.
50% abatement (FF&I)a Fossil fuel and industrial CO2 emissions are reduced
across Latin America by 12.5% in 2020, linearly
increasing to 50% in 2050, with respect to 2010.
20% abatement (GHG)a GHG emissions, excluding LUC CO2, are reduced by 5%
across Latin America in 2020, linearly increasing to 20%
in 2050, with respect to 2010.
50% abatement (GHG)a GHG emissions, excluding LUC CO2, are reduced by
12.5% across Latin America in 2020, linearly increasing
to 50% in 2050, with respect to 2010.
a These scenarios assume a common carbon price across Latin American countries. These
scenarios also assume a comparable emission reduction trajectory for the rest of the world.
However, because no trade of permits or other means to equalize prices is assumed, the
carbon prices in Latin America may be different from those in the rest of the world.
6 The fact that land use change CO2 emissions drive the variation may not be immedi-
ately apparent from theﬁgure. Even if emissions relative to 2010were to be equal in a giv-
en scenario for fossil fuel and industrial emissions, non-CO2 emissions, and land use
change CO2 emissions, total GHG emissions relative to 2010 need not be equal. This de-
pends as well on the relative proportions of fossil fuel and industrial emissions, non-CO2
emissions, and land use change CO2 emissions. Hence, this conclusion was explicitly de-
rived from a more detailed assessment of the underlying scenarios than is shown in the
ﬁgure.
517L. Clarke et al. / Energy Economics 56 (2016) 513–525dimension in different ways as well, including the last historical year in
the model (the base year) and the time steps of the model (ranging
from one year to ten years).
4. Latin American emission reductions and global climate goals
Current international climate discussions have centered on the goal
of limiting the increase in global average surface temperature. Given the
uncertainty in the relationship between global greenhouse gas (GHG)
concentrations and temperature change, most studies, including this
one, have focused instead on the change in global GHG concentrations.
At the same time, actual commitments or goals by countries are com-
monly expressed in emission reductions. It is therefore necessary to de-
velop links between the emission reductions in any country or region,
on the one hand, and long-term global goals such as concentrations or
temperature on the other.
A recent assessment by the IPCC (Clarke et al., 2014), informed by a
wide range of scenarios, found that emission reductions on the order of
40% to 70% globally by 2050, relative to 2010 levels, are roughly consis-
tent with meeting a concentration goal of 450 ppmv CO2e by 2100. The
IPCC assessment also found that these scenarios provide at least a
“likely” (66%) chance of limiting temperature change to below 2 °C
this century. It is therefore reasonable to consider 50% global reductions
by 2050, relative to 2010, as being roughly consistent with maintaining
a 66% or better chance of maintaining temperature change below 2 °C.
Abatement leading to emissions roughly at 2010 levels by 2050 might
be considered to be roughly consistentwithmaintaining a 66% or better
chance of maintaining temperature change below 3 °C.
Within this context, a relevant question is the level of abatement
that is appropriate in Latin American countries if there exists a global
goal to reduce emissions by, for example, 50% below 2010 levels by
2050. Would it be appropriate for Latin American countries to reduce
emissions by more or by less than 50%? The answer to this question is
bound up in a wide range of issues having to dowith economic efﬁcien-
cy, equity and fairness, the design of international policy, and interna-
tional geopolitics. Hence, no study can provide a deﬁnitive answer tothis question. Studies such as this one can, however, provide informa-
tion that is useful for those people actually engaged in setting
abatement goals for different countries or negotiating international
agreements.
This study explores the economic abatement potential of Latin
American countries relative to the world as a whole. In modeling stud-
ies, relative economic abatement potential is assessed from scenarios
with an economically-efﬁcient global allocation of emission reductions;
that is, scenarios in which emission reductions are distributed among
countries in a manner that minimizes the total global economic cost of
abatement. In general, and under the admittedly idealized assumption
that there are no market failures or pre-existing economic distortions
and that all markets function effectively, the economically-efﬁcient
allocation is the allocation that emerges based on the implementation
of a uniform carbon price across all sectors and countries (Clarke et al.,
2014).
It is critically important to emphasize that economic efﬁciency is
only one consideration when assessing effort-sharing approach to
abatement. A wide range of metrics for effort-sharing have been pro-
posed, many of which can be linked to different fundamental ethical
principles (Höhne et al., 2014). The capacities of countries to undertake
abatement while maintaining sustainable development are a key con-
sideration (see Section 2). It is also important to note that where emis-
sion reductions occur can be separated from who pays for those
emission reductions. In the context of a fully-efﬁcient mechanism for
ﬁnancial transfers across countries, emission reductions made within
any particular region can largely be separated from who pays for
those reductions. Under a fully-efﬁcient trading program, emission
trading would lead to abatement across regions consistent with
the economically-efﬁcient outcome explored here, but the costs for
abatement would be borne by countries in large part based on initial al-
locations. Without effective mechanisms for ﬁnancial transfers, or a
willingness to provide such transfers on the part of the developed coun-
tries, however, the actual allocations or commitments for individual
countries may more closely resemble their actual emission reductions.
With these caveats in mind, this paper compares economically-
efﬁcient abatement in Latin America with that of the world in total for
the global abatement scenarios produced in this study (the 450, 550,
and 650 ppmv scenarios) and in the recent AMPERE model intercom-
parison study (Kriegler et al., 2015).
Results for 2030 (Fig. 5) and 2050 (Fig. 2 in the Supplementary ma-
terial) tell a mixed story. In most models, overall GHG emission reduc-
tions are less aggressive in Latin America than for the world, but they
are more aggressive in several models. When splitting these overall
emissions into three parts – fossil fuel and industrial CO2 emissions,
land use change CO2 emissions, and non-CO2 emissions – a different
story emerges. The primary cause of variation in total GHG emission re-
ductions is variation in land use change CO2 emissions (note again that
land use and land use change emissions are discussed in Calvin et al. (in
this volume)).6
The story is more consistent for both fossil fuel and industrial
CO2 emissions and non-CO2 emissions. Most models ﬁnd that
economically-efﬁcient emissions in 2030 and 2050 relative to 2010 are
higher in Latin America than for the world. This would indicate, for ex-
ample, that if a 50% global reduction in fossil fuel and industrial CO2
emissions relative to 2010 is the global goal, then it is economically-
efﬁcient for Latin America to take on less aggressive emission reductions
relative to 2010.
Table 3
Key characteristics of participating models.
Model Covered
sectors
Global
scope
LAM regions Covered gases Model
base year
Model time step
(years)
Last model
year without
climate policy⁎
Recent citation
POLES Energy Global Brazil, Mexico, rest
South America, rest
Central America
CO2, CH4, N2O,
HFC, PFC, SF6
2010 1 2012 Criqui et al. (2015),
Grifﬁn et al. (2014),
Markandya et al. (2014),
Kitous et al. (2010)
TIAM-World Energy, simpliﬁed
land-Use
Global Mexico, Central and
South America
CO2, CH4, N2O
from energy and
non-energy
activities
2005 Variable length,
5 years until
2020, 10 years
after 2020.
2012 Labriet et al. (2013);
Kanudia et al. (2013)
TIAM-ECN Energy, land use
stylize
Global Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Mexico,
Venezuela, LAM-rest
CO2, CH4, N2O 2005, and 2010
calibrated
10 2010 van der Zwaan et al. (2014);
Rösler et al. (2014); Kober
et al. (2014)
IMAGE Energy, rest of
economy,
land use
Global Brazil, Mexico, RSAM,
RCAM
CO2, CH4, N2O,
HFC, PFC, SF6
(and air
pollution)
2005 1 Depends on
scenario.
van Vuuren et al. (2007);
Stehfest et al. (2014)
GCAM Energy, land use Global Brazil, Colombia, Argentina,
Chile, Central America &
Caribbean, rest of Northern
South America, rest of
Southern South America
CO2, CH4, N2O,
HFC, PFC, SF6
2010 5 2015 Wise et al. (2014)
ADAGE Energy, rest of
economy, land use
Global Brazil, Latin America CO2, CH4, N2O 2010 5 2010 Beach et al. (2011)
EPPA Energy, rest of
economy, land use
Global Brazil, Mexico, Rest of
Latin America
CO2, CH4, N2O,
HFC, PFC, SF6
2005 5 years 2010 Paltsev et al. (2014);
Paltsev et al. (2005)
Phoenix Energy, rest of
economy
Global Brazil, Colombia, Mexico,
Central America &
Caribbean, Other
Latin America
CO2 2004 1 year to 2005,
then 5 year time
steps to 2100
2015 Daenzer et al. (2014)
iPETS Energy, rest of
economy
Global Latin America CO2 2004 1 2012 O'Neill et al. (2012)
MESSAGE
Brazil
Energy Brazil Brazil CO2 2010 5 2015 Nogueira et al. (2014)
⁎ The model speciﬁcation calls for emissions reductions in 2020 and beyond. The speciﬁcation of when policy begins in order to meet these goals is unspeciﬁed. The last model year
without a climate policy – that is, the last “baseline” year – varies among models.
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models with respect to fossil fuel and industrial CO2 emissions and
non-CO2 emissions. First, given that these reductions are compared to
2010 emissions, the level of baseline emission growth is a critical indica-
tor of possible reductions (for more on baseline growth assumptions,
see van Ruijven et al., in this volume). The second issue is the potential
to reduce emissions from the baseline. As discussed above, countries
with lower reliance on high-emitting fuels such as coal should, all
other things being equal, have a lower capacity to reduce emissions.
The major cause of the less aggressive emission reductions, relative to
2010, in Latin America is baseline emission growth (Fig. 3 in the Supple-
mentary material). Economic abatement potential relative to baseline
emissions is both higher and lower than for the world, and there is no
consistent bias. Emission growth, however, is consistently higher in
Latin America than the world.
There are several outliers from this pattern; that is, there are several
scenarios in which emissions in 2050 relative to 2010 are higher in the
world in total than in Latin America. Focusing on three scenarios from
AMPERE (see the three green dots in the upper left panel of Fig. 2 in
the Supplementary material that lie below the line), these outliers
raise important issues regarding theway that models represent relative
abatement opportunities in different regions and how users of these
models should interpret results. The reason for the higher Latin
American abatement in all three of these scenarios is that bioenergy
coupled with CCS (bioCCS) is a major abatement option and that Latin
America uses this option disproportionately relative to the rest of the
world. One reason why this might make sense is that there may be
limits on bioenergy trade (see Clarke et al., 2012), and as a major
bioenergy producer, Latin America would then be obliged to preferen-
tially use its bioenergy internally. Reasons this differentiation mightnot make sense are that bioenergy trade may not, in reality, prove all
that limited and that CCS capabilities and resources could be less viable
in Latin American countries than other countries for several reasons.
Untangling these differences goes beyond the goal of this paper; and it
is beyond the scope of this paper to comment on the realism of these as-
sumptions in the context of a world 35 years from now that is taking on
aggressive global emission reductions. However, it is nonetheless useful
to raise the issue, because it points to the importance of understanding
the ways that scenarios represent regional circumstances and the as-
sumptions they are based on more broadly. It is often these assump-
tions, rather than the behavior of the models themselves, that most
directly lead to key results.
The ﬁnal question this section explores is howmuch variation there
might be in the economically-efﬁcient emission reductions among Latin
American countries. Because of limited information on most countries
in Latin America, we concentrate here only on Brazil and Mexico
(Fig. 6 and Figs. 4, 5, and 6 in the Supplementary material). A fully con-
sistent story does not emerge from the scenarios in either 2030 or 2050,
although Brazil in general appears to take on lower emission reductions
relative to 2010 than does Mexico. Again, a large reason for differences
has to dowith differences in assumptions about baseline emissions. This
is evidenced by the limited variation among scenarios regarding
emissions relative to baseline in Brazil and Mexico relative to Latin
America as a whole (Figs. 7 and 8 in the Supplementary material).
5. Carbon prices and abatement costs
The degree to which any country reduces emissions will depend
heavily on a range of different factors. Among the most relevant of
these are the economic costs of undertaking emission reductions. One
Fossil Fuel and Industrial
Land Use Change CO2
All GHG
Non-CO2
AMPERE
Fig. 5. Emissions in 2030 relative to 2010 for Latin America (vertical axis) relative to the world as a whole (horizontal axis). The upper left panel shows all GHGs, the upper right panel
shows only fossil fuel and industrial emissions, the lower left panel shows non-CO2 emissions (including non-CO2 emissions from agriculture), and the lower right panel shows CO2 emis-
sions from land use change. The chart includes information from the 450, 550, and 650 concentration scenarios along with similar information from the AMPEREmodel intercomparison
study (Kriegler et al., 2015). [Note onAMPEREdata points: POLES, IMACLIMandMERGEaremissing from theAll GHG,Non-CO2 and LandUse ChangeCO2 charts because theydonot report
Non-CO2 or LUC data. In the All GHG chart, WITCH and GCAM are not shown for the 450 scenario because the data does not lie within the range of the displayed axes. In the Land Use
Change CO2 chart, DNE21 and GCAM are omitted because the data does not lie within the range of the displayed axes.]
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functions based on scenarios, such as those in this study. These are con-
structed by plotting carbon prices relative to emission reductions. Emis-
sion reductions can be expressed relative to 2010 or relative to the
corresponding baseline scenario.EPPA GCAM TIAM-ECN POLES IM
20% abatement (FF&I)
Fig. 6. Fossil fuel and industrial CO2 emissions in 2030 relative to 2010 for Brazil anConsistentwith numerous previous studies (see, for example, Clarke
et al., 2014), an enormous range of carbon prices are estimated for Latin
America as a whole by different models, with an order of magnitude
separating the low and high estimates (Fig. 7, Fig. 8, and Figs. 9 and 10
in the Supplementary material). For a 20% reduction by 2050, in fossilAGE Phoenix TIAM-WORLD Adage
50% abatement (FF&I)
d Mexico (vertical axis) relative to Latin America as a whole (horizontal axis).
Fig. 7.Marginal abatement cost functions for total Latin America fossil fuel and industrial CO2 emissions – relative to baseline emissions – in 2030 and 2050. The round symbols show the
20% abatement (FFI) scenarios; the triangular symbols the 50% abatement (FFI) scenarios. [Note:Marginal abatement cost functions approximated by plotting carbon prices against emis-
sion reductions relative to baseline emissions.]
520 L. Clarke et al. / Energy Economics 56 (2016) 513–525industrial CO2 emissions and total non-CO2 emissions relative to 2010
levels, the lowest carbon price is 50$/tCO2-e and the highest is 450$/
tCO2-e. For a 50% reduction, the lowest carbon price is 110$/tCO2-e
and the highest is 1320$/tCO2. This variation is most extreme for the
deep abatement that is associatedwith larger transformations of the en-
ergy system. The marginal abatement cost functions are more convex
for some models than others. Those with greater convexity indicate
larger relative difﬁculties in achieving these higher levels of abatement.
It is important to note that cost estimates associatedwith reductions
relative to a particular base year (in this case, 2010) are confounded by
the baseline scenario assumptions (Figs. 9 and 10 in the Supplementary
material). The higher are emissions in the baseline scenario, the more
that emissionsmust be reduced to meet the abatement goal, and there-
fore the higher the costs. Hence, these cost estimates are potentially
subject to more uncertainty than those associated with emission reduc-
tions relative to associated baseline scenarios (Figs. 7 and 8). Evenwhen
controlling for differences in baseline scenarios by expressing abate-
ment in terms of reductions from the baseline, however, carbon prices
still exhibit an enormous variation. This result further highlights that if
the costs from these models are to be used in policy analysis, greaterFig. 8.Marginal abatement cost functions for total Latin America fossil fuel and industrial CO2 e
round symbols show the 20% abatement (GHG) scenarios; the triangular symbols the 50% abate
carbon prices against emission reductions relative to baseline emissions.]information is needed on why estimates vary so substantially across
models. Nonetheless, these differences have existed for many years.
A more general method for controlling differences between models
is to look at the variation in costs among countries or regions within
particular models (Fig. 9). Of the eight models producing information
for marginal abatement cost curves, about half exhibit very little differ-
ence in abatement costs across regions. The remaining half exhibit
meaningful variations. The basis for these variations is not explained
in this study. However, it is possible here to raise potential issues that
might inﬂuence these results. In general, those with similar results are
leaning toward a more “global” approach to abatement in which the
same technologies (e.g., nuclear power, CCS, electric cars) and fuels
(e.g., biofuels) are widely accessible across countries and regions with
little variation in cost or the difﬁculty of deployment. In these models,
the assumption is a relatively homogenous approach to, or at least po-
tential for, abatement. In contrast, themodelswith signiﬁcant variations
in costs are indicating highly differentiated potential for abatement.
Some of this differentiationmay be due to differing resource constraints
(e.g., for CCS reservoir capacity,wind, or solar power). Itmay also bedue
to assumptions about the access to fuels on the international market ormissions and non-CO2 emissions – relative to baseline emissions – in 2030 and 2050. The
ment (GHG) scenarios. [Note:Marginal abatement cost functions approximatedby plotting
Fig. 9.Marginal abatement cost functions in 2030 for fossil fuel and industrial CO2 emissions, relative to baseline emissions, across countries in Latin America (LAM). The round symbols
show the 20% abatement (FFI) scenarios; the triangular symbols the 50% abatement (FFI) scenarios. [Note: Marginal abatement cost function approximated by plotting carbon prices
against emission reductions relative to baseline emissions.]
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ticular technologies in speciﬁc countries or regions (see van der Zwaan
et al., in this volume; Clarke et al., 2012).
It is tempting to conclude that models with higher regional cost var-
iations aremore representative of reality. Only a limited literature, how-
ever, has identiﬁed some of the potential reasons for these differences
(see, for example, Clarke et al., 2012). This literature does not assessthe realism of the assumptions that lead to these different perspectives
on regional abatement opportunities, particularly in the context of a
world decades from now that is taking on substantial global emission
reductions and undergoing dramatic changes to global and regional en-
ergy systems. In addition, there are fundamental conceptual issues asso-
ciated with assessing economic cost estimates in the context of
comparability when a major factor inﬂuencing those costs may not be
522 L. Clarke et al. / Energy Economics 56 (2016) 513–525inherent characteristics of the country in question, but rather country-
level policies or societal outlooks that limit the ability to use particular
technologies (e.g., bans on nuclear power) or approaches to abatement
(e.g., limited appetite for market-based approaches).
6. The implications of current policies on abatement in Latin
American countries
To examine the role of current policies in meeting longer-term re-
duction targets, this section contrasts business as usual baselines,
which include abatementmeasures adopted prior to 2010,with stylized
policy baselines, which include measures adopted or ratiﬁed after 2010
(see Table 2). The analysis focuses on Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and
Mexico because these countries are individually represented in a num-
ber of the models in this study. The policies and their implications are
ﬁrst examined for each of these countries and then put in the context
of global abatement targets with an emphasis on the 2030 timeframe.
6.1. Argentina
Argentina's “National Strategy on Climate Change: Structure,
Background, Overall Goals and Means” was adopted in 2010 by the
Governmental Committee on Climate Change. As part of the implemen-
tation of this plan and its third National Communications on Climate
Change, Argentina is ofﬁcially developing its baseline. To this end, as
part of the CLIMACAP/LAMP project, a speciﬁc BAU baseline for
Argentina has been developed to analyze the impact of a series of
abatementmeasures to be applied in the energy sector. The policy base-
line considers the implementation of plausible abatement measures
in the energy sector to the year 2050 using the LEAP-FB model
(Di Sbroiavacca et al., in this volume).
The BAU scenario takes into account the energy policies implement-
ed shortly before the year 2010,which consist primarily of demand-side
efﬁciency measures in lighting, refrigeration, and air conditioning.
Meanwhile, the policy scenario considers a series of demand- and
supply-side abatement measures. The demand-side measures include
solar heaters in the household sector, better thermal efﬁciency in resi-
dential buildings, eco-driving in freight transport and public transport,
and the introduction of hybrid cars. Supply-side measures include
higher level of biofuel penetration in transport; the promotion of hydro-
electric, wind, nuclear, and combined cycle generation; and greater use
of biomass in electricity generation.
On the basis of the implementation of this set of measures in the
LEAP-FB model during the period 2010–2050, emissions fall from the
baseline by roughly 9% in 2020, 14% in 2030, 17% in 2040 and 18% in
2050. Applying these percentage emission reductions from baseline in
the two global models that represent Argentina, GCAM and TIAM-ECN
leads to emission prices of about 15 and 110$/tCO2. The wide disparity
in carbon prices reﬂects the issues discussed in Section 5.
6.2. Brazil
Brazil's National Plan on Climate Change was based on the general
directives of the National Policy on Climate Change, which was ap-
proved in December 2009 under Federal Law No. 12,187. The plan has
four general themes: abatement; vulnerability, impact and adaptation;
research and development; and enhancement of skills and dissemina-
tion. Its main objectives are to: (1) stimulate efﬁciency increases in a
constant search for better practices in the economic sectors; (2) keep
the high share of renewable energy in the electric matrix, preserving
the important position Brazil has always held; (3) encourage the sus-
tainable increase in the share of biofuels in the national transportmatrix
and work toward the structuring of an international market of sustain-
able biofuels; (4) seek sustained reductions in deforestation rates, in all
Brazilian biomass, in order to reach zero illegal deforestation; (5) elimi-
nate the net loss of forest coverage in Brazil by 2015; (6) strengtheninter-sector actions concerned with the reduction of the vulnerabilities
of populations; and (7) identify environmental impacts resulting from
climate change and stimulate scientiﬁc research that can trace out a
strategy to minimize the socio-economic costs of adaptation in the
country (Brasil, 2010).
Though much of the potential abatement measures in Brazil involve
the forest and agriculture sector, the focus of the present analysis is lim-
ited to energy-related emission reductions (see Calvin et al., in this
volume, this issue for a discussion of forest and agricultural issues).
The proposed energy sector actions considered in the National Plan for
Climate Change include: improve energy efﬁciency, increase the use of
bio-fuels, increase the energy supply by hydroelectric power plants, in-
crease the use of alternative energy sources and, ﬁnally, increase in the
use of charcoal from planted forests in the iron & steel industry.
The construction of Brazil's policy baseline scenario follows Brazils'
energy expansion plan out to 2022 (EPE, 2013). Hydropower and
wind power see the greatest growth. In the policy baseline scenario,
the models replicate the power sector capacity and/or output speciﬁed
in the energy expansion plan. Emission changes in 2030 are modestly
negative (−1% to−14%) for most models. However, general equilibri-
um effects in fuel markets lead to slight increases in emissions in the
Phoenix and EPPA models of 1.4% to 2.8%, respectively. Unlike other
countries in the policy baseline scenario, the representation of Brazil's
policy does not cap emissions. Emission reductions in other countries
reduce their own demand for fossil fuels and consequently market
prices for fossil fuels fall. Lacking a cap on emissions, Brazil's economic
sectors in the CGE models respond by marginally increasing fossil fuel
consumption in the baseline policy scenario due to the lower fuel prices.
6.3. Colombia
The foundation for Colombia's policy baseline is the Colombian Low
Carbon Development Strategy (CLCDS). It is composed of sectoral and
total emissions for the country after the implementation of 80 abate-
ment measures in the sectors analyzed. The CLCDS constitutes a
program that focuses on the short, medium and long run planning de-
velopment of the country. It is led by the Ministry of Environment and
Sustainable Development through its Climate Change Deputy Director-
ate with the support of the National Planning Department and the Sec-
torial Ministries. The CLCDS aims at decoupling GHG emissions from
Colombia's economic growth. This will be achieved by designing and
implementing plans, projects and policies that promote abatement of
GHG and simultaneously strengthen the social and economic growth
of Colombia following international standards in terms of efﬁciency,
competitiveness, and environmental performance. The sectors that par-
ticipate in the CLCDS are industry, energy, mining, transport, housing,
wastes and agriculture. The CLCDShas threemain objectives: (1) identi-
fy and value actions directed to avoid the accelerated growth of GHG
emissions while the productive sectors grow; (2) develop abatement
action plans for each productive sector of the country; and (3) create
and promote tools for the implementation of the abatement action
plans, including monitoring and reporting.
The following abatement actions were prioritized by the CLCDS and
are included in the policy baseline scenario. (1) Agriculture: forestry
and grazing systems, rational grazing, expanding avocado and mango
plantations, pastures renovation, improved forages in the amazon, ex-
tension program for better fertilization practices and potato production,
and biodigestors for dried coffee; (2) Transport: better standards of per-
formance in private and public transportation and green driving, elec-
tric and hybrid vehicles, bicycle promotion, cargo ﬂeet scrapping,
renovation of cargo ﬂeet, cargo ﬂeet LNG, cargo ﬂeet CNG, substitution
of road transport for railway, substitution of road transport for water;
(3) Energy (demand): energy efﬁciency, fuel substitution, new technol-
ogies, substitution of incandescent light bulbs, replacement and scrap-
ping of refrigerators, improvement in the efﬁciency of natural gas
stoves, improvement on the efﬁciency of air conditioning equipment,
Fig. 10. Fossil fuel and industrial CO2 emissions in 2030 relative to 2010 in the 650, 550, and 450 concentration scenarios (bars, 1st column, from the CLIMACAP–LAMP scenarios; stars are
thehigh and lowvalues from theAMPERE study for the 450 and 550 scenarios— seeKriegler et al., 2015), under projectedbaselines (2nd column), and policy baseline (3rd column) for the
world, Latin America, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, andMexico. The bar ranges forworld and Latin American concentration targets are based on results from ﬁvemodels with country-level
coverage by model as follows: GCAM, TIAM-ECN (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico); IMAGE, POLES (Brazil, Mexico); TIAM-World (Brazil). Note that the upper end of the 450 and 550
ranges include the use of negative emission technologies (i.e., biomass energy with carbon capture and storage) after mid-century.
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solar, geothermal, biomass, diesel and co-generation electric genera-
tion, goodmanagement practices, capture of CO2; (5)Wastes: establish-
ment of parks for waste recovery, minimization of wastes send to
landﬁlls, increasing of recycling, energy recovery from industrialwastes,
recovery of organic wastes, composting, biogas recovery, capture and
burnt of biogas generated in landﬁlls and wastewater plants, more efﬁ-
cient means for recollection and transportation of solid wastes.
The measures analyzed above had the highest abatement potential.
Reductions include the potential for reductions in non-CO2 GHG's but
do not include reductions from land use and land use change, which ac-
count for 20% of Colombia's emissions. The baseline policy, constructed
from the expected reductions from these policies and measures, is im-
plemented as an emission cap from2015 through 2050. In 2030 the pol-
icy caps CO2 emissions at about 60% above 2010 levels or 33% for all
GHG's.7
Under the cap, emission reductions from baseline in 2030 for the
three models that break out Colombia are about 40% in GCAM and
Phoenix, yet only 25% in TIAM-ECNbecause of lower baseline emissions.
The corresponding carbon prices needed to reach those reduction levels
are about 35, 50, and 55$/tCO2 respectively. The GDP loss in 2030 esti-
mated by the Phoenix model, the only computable general equilibrium
model of the three, is 1.6% relative to baseline GDP.6.4. Mexico
Mexico's low-carbon growth strategy responds to both the recogni-
tion of its high vulnerability to the risks of climate change and its role as
a facilitator of the international negotiation process to reach a global cli-
mate agreement. Although Mexico's emissions contribute only to
roughly 2% of global GHG emissions, the country has set ambitious tar-
gets, based on its abatement capacity, meant to align to the global effort
require to reach a stabilization scenario of 550 ppm. For 2020, Mexico's
emission reduction goal is to reduce 30% from its baseline emissions,
and for 2050, the country has pledge a potential 50% reduction from
2010 levels, provided that developed countries ﬁnance clean energy
and adaptation actions and support technology transfers. In 2012,
Mexico enacted its General Law for Climate Change that sets the legal
foundation to advance climate policy (Federal Government of Mexico,
2012 & 2014).7 The policy baseline for Colombia is in million metric tons of CO2 (CO2-eq for Kyoto
gases) is 81 (165) in 2020, 106 (196) in 2030, 144 (247) in 2040 and 178 (293) in 2050.Mexico's ambitious long-term strategywill require amajor transfor-
mation of the energy sector. For example, the National Commission for
Climate Change has targeted emissions from power generation, with
the goal of reaching a 35% participation of clean energy (non-fossil) by
2024, 40% by 2030 and 50% by 2050.
The representation of the National Climate Strategy in the policy
baseline targets a 30% reduction in emissions below BAU in 2020. Emis-
sions are held constant thereafter. This is less than the potential pledge
of a 50% reduction by2050,which is contingent uponﬁnancing fromde-
veloped countries. The constant emission target from 2020 to 2030 is
intended to represent one plausible future emission pathway that is
consistent with limited outside ﬁnancing.
The carbon prices in 2030needed to reach these emission reductions
fall within a range of 50 to 75$/tCO2 for six of the sevenmodels with the
remaining model at 20$/tCO2. The two CGE models, EPPA and Phoenix,
estimate the GDP loss in 2030, relative to baseline GDP, at 1.5% and 1.8%
respectively.6.5. National policies in the global context
Having examined country-level policies for four major countries in
Latin American, it is useful to understand if these policies are consistent
with global climate goals discussed in the previous sections. Although
the four countries above constitute the majority current emissions, the
treatment of the remaining countries in Latin America will affect the
comparison. For the purpose of this exercise we assume that the other
countries in Latin Americawill undertake emission reductions at the av-
erage level of the four we have already analyzed, with the exception of
Chile,whichhas a 2020 Copenhagen pledge of 20%belowbaseline emis-
sions. This translates to a 17% reduction from baseline for Latin
American in 2030. The policy baselines for non-Latin American regions
use the emission pathways from Kriegler et al. (2013) from the LIMITS
“strengthened policy baselines”, which follow Copenhagen pledges to
2020 and lower emission intensity thereafter. The pathway for non-
Latin American regions is calculated as the average emissions of the
GCAM, IMAGE, and WITCH models and caps CO2 emissions at 24%
above 2010 emission levels in 2030 for these regions.
The policy baseline reductions are then compared against the reduc-
tions in the globally economically-efﬁcient scenarios considered in pre-
vious sections. It is worth reiterating that the globally economically-
efﬁcient policies are only one input for examining appropriate emission
reductions across the globe (see Section 4). In addition, as noted
earlier, the economically-efﬁcient allocation indicates where emission
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these emission reductions.
For Latin America as a whole, the national policies produce emis-
sions in 2030 that are generally consistent with reductions associated
with 450 ppmv CO2 emission goals from the CLIMACAP–LAMP and the
AMPERE scenarios (Fig. 10).
Argentina's policy baseline is consistent with emissions in the
550 ppmv CLIMACAP–LAMP scenarios for one of the two models
(GCAM), yet remains above the 650 ppmv range for the other model
(TIAM-ECN). (Note that range based on the concentration scenarios
was only derived from these same two models, which also produced
the policy baselines.) On average, Brazil's policy baseline exhibits
small emission reduction from baseline. The results are inconclusive as
to whether these emission levels are consistent with a particular con-
centration target. Brazil's 2030 policy baseline emissions stretch from
above the 650 ppmv range sketched out by the CLIMACAP–LAMP
models to within the upper part of the 450 ppmv range. Under
Colombia's policy baseline, two of the threemodels produce 2030 emis-
sions that are consistentwith the 450 ppmv range from the CLIMACAP–
LAMP models and the third model is near the upper end of that range.
Unsurprisingly Mexico's aggressive policy baseline brings emissions
from all models included in the analysis to within or below the
450 ppmv range.
7. Concluding thoughts
This paper has explored abatement potential in Latin American
countries, and it has explored the consistency of current policy trajecto-
ries with those potentials. As with every region or country, Latin
America has unique and important characteristics that inﬂuence its
abatement potential. These include its development status, the heavy
use of hydropower in some countries, and the importance of non-CO2
emissions and land use change CO2 emissions in some Latin American
countries.
The research, based on scenarios generated in this study as well as
those from previous studies, indicates that it would be economically-
efﬁcient for Latin America to undertake less abatement of fossil fuel
and industrial CO2 emissions and non-CO2 emissions relative to 2010
levels than the rest of the world (note that land use change CO2 emis-
sions are treated separately in a companion paper, Calvin et al., in this
volume). One implication is that if a global reduction of 50% relative to
2010 is consistent with limiting temperature change to less than 2 °C,
then the economically-efﬁcient Latin American reductions would be
less than 50% relative to 2010 levels. In large part, this result derives
from a common assumption across models that Latin American emis-
sions will grow more rapidly than those of the world as a whole.
Given the uncertainty inherent in long-term emission projections, it is
therefore important to view these results with some caution.
Consistent with previous research (Clarke et al., 2014), there are or-
ders of magnitude differences in the carbon prices associated with
meeting the reductions explored in this study. Prices range from about
50 to 450$/tCO2-e to obtain a 20% percent reduction in fossil and indus-
trial CO2 emissions and total non-CO2 emissions in 2050 relative to 2010
levels. For a 50% reduction, they range from about 110 to over 1320$/
tCO2-e.
This study also analyzed the role that recently enacted and proposed
policies may play in achieving long-term climate targets. Looking only
at fossil fuel and industrial emissions out to 2030, the results indicate
that such policies in Argentina, Colombia, and Mexico would limit the
growth in emissions to roughly 17% above 2010 levels by 2030 com-
pared to projected increases of over 40% over the same period without
the policies. Acknowledging the importance of land-use policy in
Brazil, the current energy-related policies show small reductions in
2030 emissions.
Asmuch as this paper has identiﬁed some important issues associat-
ed with abatement potential and current policies, it has equallyidentiﬁed some important limitations in the ability of integratedmodels
to inform policy discussions. Some of these may be rectiﬁed with im-
provements to modeling tools, but others are simply reﬂections of the
uncertainty that surrounds policy making at national and international
levels. Here we highlight several of these. First, although formal models
can help to inform our understanding of the economics of abatement,
every study of abatement relative to a particular base year is heavily
confoundedbybaseline scenario assumptions,which are closely aligned
with model inputs. Accordingly, every commitment or goal to reduce
emissions relative to a particular year is subject to this same baseline
uncertainty. Second, formal models continue to provide an extremely
large range of estimates of economic costs for abatement, often differing
by orders of magnitude or more, particularly for more ambitions abate-
ment that would push energy systems far from their current conﬁgura-
tions. Future research is needed to help users of information to
understand the reasons for these differences. Third, although several
models now include quite sophisticated models of land and land use
change, there remain core issues about how to treat land usewithin na-
tional policymaking and international negotiations that lead to very dif-
ferent results from models. This is particularly important for future
assessments of abatement potential in Latin America. Future research
is needed into the modeling of land use policy approaches and their in-
tegration into the broader modeling of climate policy. Fourth, there is a
need to apply formal models to explore the implications of emerging
policy commitments andproposals. However, doing so raises difﬁculties
associatedwith understanding current and proposed policies in all their
complexity and then implementing these policies in formal models.
There is no easy solution for this challenge other than to keep the
modeling community interacting with the policy-making community.
Finally, consistent with previous work, this study has made clear a
key difference in theway that differentmodels treat regional abatement
opportunities. Many models take a relatively global perspective to
abatement, assuming relatively similar opportunities across countries.
These models ﬁnd similar abatement costs and abatement approaches
across countries. Other models ﬁnd very different abatement costs and
approaches across countries, reﬂecting unique local circumstances and
limits on trade in key sectors (e.g., bioenergy or natural gas) that drive
differences in abatement opportunities. This paper has not untangled
the various reasons for these differences between models or come to
any conclusion about which assumptions may or may not be most real-
istic. However, it is clear that these differences are important for
informing both national and international policy discussions, and we
believe that this would be a valuable direction for future research.Acknowledgments
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